Following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis the world has witnessed a re-accommodation of the global financial system. In the particular case of middle-income countries they have disentangled themselves from the conditionality of the IMF and grown into more assertive actors in international forums, proposing new alternative mechanisms to become more financially independent and for the provision of development assistance. This article critically reviews the new reality by assessing the strategies deployed by developing countries to reduce the IMF's influence, and explores the potential consequences of the rise of middle-income nations for Law and Development.
Introduction
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed the flourishing of economies in the Global South. After the stormy 1990s when economies in Asia and Latin America were struck by financial crises, countries in both regions have steadily grown, demonstrating strong resilience during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
Emerging economies are no longer the needy clients of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that now looks for new 'clients' elsewhere.
In contrast to the 'one-model-fits-all' approach of IMF programs in the 1990s, the transition from a state in crisis to a flourishing state has been achieved through different paths where each country adopted its own tailored model. In their relations with the IMF, the situation of these countries has changed since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 (AFC). Developing countries have implemented diverse strategies to reduce their dependency on IMF financial assistance. Simultaneously, and with a sound financial position at home, emerging economies now seek greater influence in the global financial order, not only claiming a more influential voice in traditional forums but also proposing new initiatives.
Due to the new reality, questions arise as to the consequences of this reaccommodation for the IMF and whether the rising contribution of developing countries to the global economy will be accompanied by a concomitant increase in their influence on the global order that will, in turn, be reflected in the practice of Law and Development. Whereas this is a field that has been highly influenced by the debate on the meaning of 'development' and the provision of development assistance, this article limits its scope to critically reviews the strategies implemented by developing countries to reduce their dependence on IMF financial assistance as well as to build a more inclusive and pluralistic global financial order.
The article observes that the strong resurgence of emerging economies has not been accompanied by an equivalent rebalance in the influence of these economies in international forums, including the IMF whose governance reform package has not yet entered into force due to the lack of support from the United States. In spite of the long way ahead, developing countries have become more assertive on the international stage and have launched new alternatives. This new reality should contribute with the definition of a more pluralistic agenda for Law and Development.
Law and Development prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
For decades, academics have studied the interaction between legal institutions and development, leading to the creation of a body of knowledge that has been known as 'Law and Development'. Trubek and Santos, and Ohnesorge define it as a field that focuses on the socio-economic role of law in supporting development.
1 It is influenced by disciplines such as economic theory, development theory, and politics as well as the policies and practices of development organisations and international financial institutions (IFIs). Since its inception, Law and Development has been tied to the financial and development assistance provided by national development agencies and
IFIs and it has been influenced by the debate on what 'development' means. Trubek and
Santos divide the history of Law and Development into three phases. 2 The following paragraphs briefly review these three 'moments'.
The seminal work of Max Weber and the theory of modernisation contributed to the genesis of the first Law and Development movement. For Weber, a modern economy required a predictable legal system, 'the functioning of which is calculable in accordance with rational rules.' 3 Only the West, Weber argued, experienced a complete development of its legal system that was systematically elaborated and separated from other non-legal norms. The development and maintenance of this 'rational order,'
Weber argues, has been managed by people who have received legal training.
Furthermore, the process used (and continues to use) deductive and rational methods very different from customary-normative systems. Weber concludes that it is thanks to this progress of law that capitalist economies involved gained the stability they needed to flourish. For this author, only countries with 'legal rationality' were capable of achieving full industrialisation. In this second wave, some efforts were directed to discuss the relevance of the rule of law not only to achieving economic development but also to promoting democracy and human rights; however, the debate was dominated by the former and, for example, greater emphasis was given to the protection of economic rights. Similarly to the first wave of Law and Development, the neo-liberal rule of law relied heavily on models designed in forums controlled by major industrialised countries with little or no consideration of the domestic context of the developing countries into which the models were to be transplanted. In this moment, the focus of Law and Development changed from formal law to a thin notion of rule of law that was used to convince the South of the importance of adopting market legal institutions to achieve development. is open to discussion whether a fourth moment of Law and Development has emerged.
The novel switch in power relations was a response to various factors; however, an element common to many developing countries was the discontent produced by the IMF programs in the 1990s. Resentment towards IMF programs encouraged these nations to explore means to reduce IMF interference in domestic affairs.
When developing countries started implementing various mechanisms to diminish IMF influence, the approach negatively affected the institution. Few people remember the critical situation in which the IMF was immersed prior to the onset of the GFC. It was facing its own crisis, trying to survive financially and rebuild a reputation Under these SBAs (which the IMF Guidelines on Conditionality stated were not legal agreements), 22 countries had to adopt a neo-liberal program that embraced the set of prescriptions included in the so-called Washington Consensus. Measures to be adopted included fiscal discipline, re-ordering public expenditure priorities (away from subsidies), tax reform, financial liberalisation, unified exchange rates, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of foreign direct investment, privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation, and protection of property rights. 23 The key strategy of the neoliberal recipe was 'less government intervention, more freedom in the market'. 24 The formula would, it was widely believed by post-Keynesian economists and advisers, bring prosperity and development to poorer countries. Despite such ostensibly good intentions, the implementation of IMF programs in many cases exacerbated the consequences of crises and increased social and economic instability as well as inequality. 25 Due to the negative social, political and economic impact of IMF programs, discontent with the IMF grew, prompting developing nations to think of ways to reduce IMF ascendancy in their regions. It would be beyond the bounds of the present article to explain in detail each of the mechanisms deployed by developing countries to regain control of their domestic financial affairs; however, the author will review four of the mechanisms supported by the Global South (below).
International reserves
One of the first measures put in place by developing countries to reduce IMF influence was the accumulation of international reserves. Should financial crises arise, these resources would serve as the first line of defence and provide the necessary liquidity for nations affected instead of those nations applying for IMF financial assistance. Most countries took advantage of favourable financial market conditions to accomplish this. One of the outcomes of this debate was that the IMF decided that it needed to rethink its operations and adopt a new income model that included the sale of a portion of its gold reserves, expansion of investment strategies to generate higher returns, and reinstatement of the practice of recovering costs that the IMF incurs in the operations of the trust fund for concessional lending to low-income countries by reimbursing the General Resource Account for these costs. 34 The IMF also decided to reduce its bureaucracy.
Paradoxically, the GFC provided the IMF with an 'unexpected' opportunity to recover from the reduction of income with the arrival of new European 'clients' affected by the GFC. 35 Its total credit outstanding portfolio rose to SDR21. 487 billion by December 2008 from SDR9. 833 billion a year earlier, further increasing to a peak of SDR95.808 billion in December 2012. 36 Nonetheless, it is difficult to find a Latin American or Asian middle-income country among current IMF debtors. Pakistan is the only Asian country that has a current arrangement with the institution funded by the General Reserve Account and Bangladesh has a facility supported by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (Table 1) . Colombia, Mexico and Honduras have current arrangements with the IMF but they have not withdrawn money from those facilities.
Reforms of IMF governance and the role of the new G20
As developing countries became more financially sound, they started demanding reforms of IMF's governance in order to achieve greater transparency in the design of policies and programs. The IMF viewed these claims as an opportunity to attract money from emerging economies with large international reserves; the increase of emerging economies' quotas would boost IMF's resources available to address financial crises.
To capture the support of middle-income countries, the IMF agreed to review several policies, including the allocation of quotas among members in order to increase developing nations' voting power. with an ad-hoc quota increase for 54 members. Then, in 2010, the members agreed upon a set of reforms contained in the 14 th General Review of Quotas that introduces a historic doubling of quotas and a major realignment of quota-shares that involves a shift of more than 6% from over-represented to under-represented members and more than 6% quota shift to developing countries. 37 The greatest beneficiaries of these changes would be among emerging economies. In the particular case of China, its IMF quota would rise from 2% to 6.4%. Another innovative reform approved was to move to a more representative Executive Board with all members elected to the Board.
The 14 th General Review of Quotas reform involves an amendment to the IMF
Articles of the Agreement. 38 For the amendment to come into effect, it needs acceptance by at least three-fifths of IMF members, representing 85% of the total voting power (Article XXVIII). Members agreed that they would make their best efforts to complete their domestic approval processes by October 2012; however, the amendment has not entered into force at August 2015.
These reforms -known as 'the voice and participation reforms' -represent a step in the right direction to strengthening the participation of developing countries in IMF governance; however, it does not significantly change the way in which the IMF makes its decisions. When the reforms enter in force, almost 47% of IMF voting power will be still controlled by nine developed countries, and the US vote (17%) will be still needed to pass important decisions where a qualified vote of 85% is required, including the implementation of the new SDR quota system and the reform of the Executive Board (Table 2) . 39 An example of the difficulties faced by members' attempts to give developing countries more voice is the fact that these reforms have not come into effect as the US Congress has not approved the proposed changes, although the vast majority of the IMF members have already accepted the proposed SDR quotas (members representing 77% of the total voting powers) and the reform of the Executive Board (members representing 80% of the voting powers). 40 At the same time that the IMF was working on strengthening the voting share of developing countries in 2008, major industrialised economies decided to implement another strategy to retain control of the Institution and of the global financial order in general. That year, the importance of the G20 was significantly altered. Initially formed in 1999 during the AFC by the G7 finance ministers (in the face of some opposition from the IMF which not unreasonably viewed it as a rival) and meeting at least annually thereafter, these meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors attempted to move to this forum the relevant discussions on policies, programs and key decisions. 41 number of national economies, G20 'Summits' (heads of government meetings) were held in addition to G20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors. The G20 became more widely accepted (even within the IMF) as an avenue for the making of decisions and the formulation of policies to be adopted by the IMF to deal with the rolling crises. 42 This group defines itself as 'the premier forum for international economic cooperation.' 43 The G20 represents countries responsible for 85% of the global economy and includes developed countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, UK and US), and emerging nations (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa). The European
Union is also a member of the G20.
The pragmatic implication of the strengthening of the G20 is that this plurilateral forum has divided developing countries into two groups: the first formed by those emerging markets that are ranked within the biggest global economies and are represented in the G20; and the second, that of developing countries whose economies contribute less than 15% of the global input and are represented in the IMF but not in the G20.
The use of a plurilateral approach instead of multilateralism has become common where major industrialised economies have found it difficult to negotiate multilateral agreements in a way that accommodates their interests due to the multiplicity of countries with vast and competing interests. 44 In the case of the IMF, it seems easier for developed countries to negotiate with ten emerging economies within the context of the G20 rather than a greater number of IMF members; however, this approach delegitimises smaller economies in both categories, muting their voices, concerns and contributions in the fundamental process of decision and policy making and program design.
Regional forums
Another strategy employed by developing countries to reduce IMF influence has been the organisation of regional forums that can be a more reliable and less intrusive source of emergency funds in the event of financial crises. While major industrialised countries have been willing to create plurilateral forums to group like-minded countries (e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)) and to address regional problems (e.g., European Financial Stability Facility), they have opposed the use of similar strategies by developing countries. In the aftermath of the AFC, for example, Japan suggested the creation of an Asian monetary fund, a proposal that was opposed by the US Treasury Department, which argued that such a regional fund would undermine the IMF by lending money with inconsistent policy conditions. 45 Consequently, the idea was dismissed and the ASEAN members together with China, Japan and South Korea agreed, under the Chiang Mai Initiative, to a bilateral system of currency swaps (rather than a new regional financial institution) to assist nations affected by future crises.
Although initially the arrangement was thought to exclude any IMF involvement, the final product, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), has been designed as an IMF supplementary mechanism. The CMIM is currently a USD240 billion self-managed reserve pooling mechanism that provides short-term swap facilities to countries in need. 46 Each economy's swap quota depends on its CMIM pool contribution, its level of development, and size. If a country requests to use more than 30% of its CMIM quota, the transaction must be linked to an IMF program; 47 thus, the IMF has the capacity to influence conditionality for most of the swaps conducted under this arrangement. This prevents circumstances arising where a country affected by a financial crisis receives assistance from both sources (i.e. IMF and CMIM) under conditions that may be contradictory. Whilst China and Japan each contributed with 32% of the CMIM funds, decisions on fundamental issues associated with the Initiative must be approved by consensus which is a main difference with the IMF governance.
With less success than its Asian counterparts, South America has also sought alternative options to face financial crises, avoiding the IMF. billion each; Ecuador and Paraguay USD400 million each; and Bolivia and Paraguay USD100 million each. In spite of the uneven contributions, each member has one vote, and decisions are made by a qualified majority in case of structural matters and major financing projects decisions, and by a simple majority for other decisions on operational matters. 49 Banco del Sur has not started providing loans yet and it is unclear whether it would incorporate conditions into its agreements; however, one of the goals of the Bank is to offer financial instruments that are compatible with the economic and fiscal policies of each beneficiary country; thus, it is unlikely that the institution will include IMF-type of conditionality that affect national policies.
Some commentators have suggested that Banco del Sur is more a political project than a serious and articulated financial response to future South American crises. 50 They argue that ideological differences among its members will impede efficient operation. Others see the new regional institution as a welcome player that will contribute fresh ideas to the development debate and serve as a counterbalance to the influence of Western-controlled IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank. China, for example, provides non-conditional financial assistance to countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The Chinese government has developed its own set of principles to guide the provision of foreign aid and they differ from those developed under the DAC umbrella. 56 Chinese in this area have described the country's SouthSouth cooperation as collaboration among sovereign states to achieve mutual benefits.
57
China's financial assistance does not generally attach policy or governance conditionality. The country considers itself as 'developing' too; thus, it assumes development assistance is a mechanism that facilitates the exchange of development experiences with other like-minded countries. China's assistance has benefited 93 countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. A recent study has estimated that, in 2011 alone, China made new commitments for foreign aid for an amount close to USD189.3 billion which was equivalent to about 3% of the country's GDP. 58 Other more conservative studies estimate Chinese foreign aid in USD7 billion in 2013. 59 At the 2011 OECD Fourth High Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (South Korea), IFIs and DAC countries initially tried to agree with emerging economies from the BRICSAM group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico) on a set of unified principles that would guide the provision of financial assistance for development. 60 However, participants could not reach agreement, although they supported the final declaration in which it was recognised that modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South cooperation differ from those that apply to North-South cooperation. 61 BRICSAM's position was relevant, particularly for China that (as was emphasized earlier) provides substantial financial development aid without attaching conditions that are common in IFI sponsored programs. Consequently, BRICSAM has not joined the aid effectiveness panel that was created in the Busan meeting. 62 The financial assistance offered by China could be considered as politically and economically motivated. For many developing countries; however, it is as an opportunity to access financial assistance in competitive terms without structural conditionality.
The rise of emerging economies and the future of Law and Development
The expansion of development cooperation sources as well as the rising influence of emerging economies has been reflected in the field of Law and Development. Different from the precedent moments where the debate was highly influenced by IFIs and wealthier developed countries, relying heavily on theoretical frameworks that originated in Western universities and 'think-tank' institutions, the current moment reflects more fairly the interest of developing countries.
The Global South has assumed a more proactive role in the definition of development cooperation and deciding how law should be interconnected with the development process. The change can be perceived in the increase number of collaborative projects that involve Western and developing-country institutions, academics and practitioners. This collaboration is the source of new ideas that capture a more accurate picture of each developing country and avoid the formulation of grandtheories. 63 Instead of a debate focused on single developed nations IFI agenda, multiple agendas with a more pluralistic content have arisen where several approaches compete and non-traditional providers of development assistance offer alternative development aid products.
In this pluralistic scenario, there is no a unique role for law. Whilst it is still common to find academic studies influenced by the old schools of Law and Development that advocates for the modernisation of law and the strengthening of the rule of law, it is also becoming more familiar to find innovative perspectives that use the law in different ways. A good example reviewed in this article is the way in which developing countries are using a more equalitarian conception of international economic law in forums such as Banco del Sur, the NDB BRICS and CMIM in order to build more transparent and legitimate governance systems. This approach is a clear reaction of the South to governance of traditional IFIs that uses economic and political power as sole factors to allocate voting rights, concentrating the decision-making process in a small group of countries.
On the other hand, the IMF remains unchanged. The onset of the GFC overshadowed the debate on the future of the institution and its overdue governance reform. The Global South responded to the slow process of IMF reforms by using a more assertive approach, creating innovative mechanisms for mutual development cooperation as well as gestating new forums and institutions.
Although emerging economies still do not have a key role in the decisionmaking process of the international financial order, they are demonstrating political maturity and the financial strength to explore new alternatives that do not necessarily have to agree completely with US and European models. This reality does not mean that emerging economies will completely depart from a market economic model or that they will not support initiatives to strengthen the rule of law. They will continue to develop a market-oriented economy and work on a concept of the rule of law in order to promote democracy, human rights and a market economy but, contrary to the traditional IFI approach, these nations will envisage methods and mechanisms that consider local circumstances, experience and interests. However, Weber conceded that England was an exception: a country that achieved development without a 'rational legal system'. 
